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I. INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 to
mitigate the hostility of courts enforcing arbitration agreements.' The
FAA's coverage provision, section 2, endorses the enforcement of
arbitration agreements "in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce.., save upon such
2
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Section 1 of the FAA excludes from coverage "contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce. "'
In 1973, the Supreme Court first faced the issue of the enforceability
of arbitration agreements in the employment context in Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo.' The Court did not consider the scope of section 1
or section 2 of the FAA. It relied instead on other grounds in refusing
to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in a collective-bargaining
In Alexander, the Court held that "[ain employee's
agreement.'
statutory right to trial de novo under... the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
not foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under
6
the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement."
* Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University. J.D. University of Iowa College of Law;
M.A. Duquesne University; B.A. Grinnell College.
** Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University. J.D. University of Iowa College of Law;
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1. Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
4. 415 U.S. 36, 36-37 (1974) (Syllabus).
5. Id. at 36-38 (Syllabus).
6. Id. at 36 (Syllabus).
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In 1991, the Court faced the issue of the enforceability of arbitration
agreements contained in securities registration applications in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp] The Court declined to address the scope
of the section 1 exclusion because Gilmer's arbitration clause was not
contained in a contract of employment; but instead, it was found in
Gilmer's securities registration application.8 The Court simply followed
the uniform conclusions of the lower courts "that the exclusionary
clause in section 1 of the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses
contained in such registration applications,"9 and avoided the
antecedent question of whether agreements to arbitrate in private, noncollectively bargained employment contracts were excluded from FAA
coverage by section 1.0

In the 2001 case of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams," the United
States Supreme Court faced the question of the enforceability of
arbitration agreements in private employment contracts head on. A
majority of the Court declared unequivocally: "Section 1 exempts from
the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers." 12 By
so holding, the Supreme Court endorsed the view of a majority of
jurisdictions," and rejected the view of the Ninth Circuit.'4
The Supreme Court reached its holding in two large interpretive
7. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
8. Id. at 25 n.2. In Gilmer, amici had raised the antecedent issue of whether contracts of
employment were wholly exempt from the FAA under section 1. Id. Since Gilmer had failed
to raise this issue in the lower courts, the Court stated, "we will leave for another day the
issue raised by amici curiae." Id. Instead, the majority simply relied on the fact that Gilmer's
contract was not an employment contract because his contract was with the securities
exchanges, and not with his employer, Interstate. Id. As such, it did not implicate the
language of section 1.
9. Id.
10. The two dissenters in Gilmer took issue with the majority's failure to address this
"antecedent question." Id. at 36. In their opinion, "arbitration clauses contained
in
employment agreements are specifically exempt from coverage of the FAA." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
11. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
12. Id. at 119.
13. The Court cited McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 575-76 (10th Cir. 1998);
O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hospital, 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply
Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services, 105 F.3d
1465, 1470-72 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-48 (5th
Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596-601 (6th Cir. 1995); Erving v.
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. DuPont,443
F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Tenney Engineering,Inc. v. United Electric & Machine Workers
of America, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953). Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111.
14. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1999); see also
Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
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steps. First, the Court rejected the contention that "an employment
contract is not a 'contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate
commerce' at all, since the word 'transaction' in section 2 extends only
to commercial contracts."15 The court reasoned, "If all contracts of
employment are beyond the scope of the Act under the section 2
coverage provision, the separate exemption for 'contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in... interstate commerce' would be pointless." 6 The

majority concluded that Congress, by using the language "involving
interstate commerce," intended to regulate employment contracts, a

type of commercial contract, to the fullest extent of its power. 7 This
justifies the section 1 exemption of certain employment contracts from
the reach of the FAA. Justice Stevens' dissent accuses the majority of
"[p]laying ostrich to the substantial history behind the amendment,"'"
while asserting there is no "evidence that the proponents of the

legislation intended it to apply to agreements affecting employment."' 9
15. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113. The dissent stated that "[t]he majority's reasoning is
squarely contradicted by... Bernhardtv. PolygraphicCo. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 200, 201
n.3 (1956), where the Court concluded that an employment contract did not 'evidence' a
transaction involving commerce' within the meaning of section 2 of the Act." Id. at 128
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Breyer also dissented. Id.
16. Id. at 113. The dissent noted that the section 1 exemption language was an
amendment to the original draft of the statute in response to concerns by representatives of
organized labor "that the legislation might authorize federal judicial enforcement of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts and collective-bargaining agreements." Id. at 127
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "it is not 'pointless' to adopt a clarifying
amendment in order to eliminate opposition to a bill." Id. at 128.
17. Id. at 113. The majority relied on Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 277 (1995). Justice Souter's dissent found this expansive reading of "involving
commerce" as implementing Congress's intent "to fully exercise its commerce power,"
unobjectionable and consistent with Allied-Bruce, but noted that, in that case, the Court
engaged in expansive interpretation of statutory language when it "held that 'involving
commerce' showed just such a plenary intention, even though at the time.., we had long
understood 'affecting commerce' to be the quintessential expression of an intended plenary
exercise of commerce power." Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 135-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent took issue with the majority's refusal
to consider neither "the history of the drafting of the original bill by the ABA, nor the
records of the deliberations in Congress during the years preceding the ultimate enactment of
the Act in 1925." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,
147-48 (1994), for the proposition that "[w]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a
statutory text that is clear.") The majority refused to consider testimony by the chairman of
the American Bar Association (ABA) committee that drafted the legislation or statements by
the Secretary of Commerce before a Senate subcommittee hearing because the statements
were not "made by a Member of Congress, nor were they included in the official Senate and
House reports." Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119-20.
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Having disposed of this first interpretive hurdle, the Court, in an
impressive display of hermeneutical legerdemain, dusted off the
interpretive maxim ejusdem generis2 ° and proceeded to interpret the
section 1 language of "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce" as evidencing a very narrow congressional intent
to regulate only contracts of transportation workers." The dissenters
took issue with the majority's interpretation of section 1, finding that
interpreting "involving commerce" in section 2 and "engaged in
commerce" in section 1 so differently is both disingenuous" and
20. The interpretive maxim of ejusdem generis is used to justify the Court's conclusion
that the residual phrase "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" must be controlled and defined by its definitional phrase, "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees." Id. at 115.
21. Id. at 114-15. Since the residuary phrase is controlled and defined by the definitional
phrase, this "other class of workers" must be clearly analogous to seamen, railroad
employees, or both. As a result, the Court concluded that section 1 excludes only contracts of
employment of transportation workers. See also Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,
1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In this respect, the dissent's analysis was just as plausible and more
compelling. The dissent argued that Congress was, in the definitional clause, specifically
exempting those whom, under controlling constitutional interpretations of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause in 1925, it could permissibly regulate, and exempting,
through the residuary clause, all those others it could not. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 140
(Souter, J., dissenting). Under this interpretation, Congress's definitional exclusion was the
general one of "any class of workers engaged in interstate commerce." The exclusion of
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees" was inserted to placate those who
feared the FAA might upset pending legislation specifically directed at maritime and railroad
workers. See id. at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed Congress was simply
being thorough, finding that "the explanation for the catchall is not ejusdem generis; instead,
the explanation for the specifics is ex abundanti cautela, abundance of caution." Id. at 140
(Souter, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 114. It is disingenuous, as argued by Adams, that Congress intended to
exclude from arbitration the class of workers it certainly had the power to regulate while
authorizing arbitration of those it likely could not. Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Similarly, the dissent argued that it is disingenuous to believe that Congress, in 1925, believed
employees stood in a sufficiently powerful bargaining position with employers to produce fair
arbitration agreements. Id. at 138-39. The year of 1925 lay within a period of American
history marked by violent episodes of rebellion by the working class and equally violent
reactions against them by the government and the owners of capital. This period culminated
legislatively in the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, which explicitly guaranteed workers
the rights to organize, select exclusive bargaining representatives, and engage in concerted
labor activities, while prohibiting employers from intimidating or coercing employees to
eschew collective action. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1994); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157
(detailing employee rights); 29 U.S.C. §158 (detailing unfair labor practices by employers).
The dissent also noted that the majority's expansive reading of section 2 is in stark
contrast to its narrow reading of section 1. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 134-35 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority gives the "involving commerce" language of
section 2 a broad, evolutionary reading to include not only those commercial contracts
Congress could regulate under the limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause in 1925,
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inconsistent. with the Court's own precedents. 3
While the Supreme Court's decision succeeds in settling the
fundamental issue of the enforceability of arbitration agreements,
specifically compulsory, prospective agreements like those present in
Circuit City, its decision offers no new guidance as to the permissible
scope of such arbitration agreements' provisions, the bargaining
conditions that must be met for such agreements to be enforceable, or
the consequences for failing to meet any required conditions. Similarly,
the decision sheds no new light on the extent to which arbitration under

the FAA inherently conflicts with federal statutory law. ' These issues
now demand our attention. In Part II, we will examine the line of
decisions that led to the Circuit City decision's majority opinion and
dissents. In Part III, we will examine case law from other jurisdictions
to ascertain the permissible scope and negotiating conditions of
enforceable arbitration agreements and the extent to which arbitration
under the FAA inherently conflicts with federal statutory law.
but also those contracts Congress can now regulate under the modern expansive reading of
the Commerce Clause that began in 1937. Id. at 134. Conversely, the dissent noted the
majority's narrow non-evolutionary reading of section 1 "engaged in commerce" to
encompass only those employment contracts Congress was certain it could regulate in 1925,
i.e., contracts of transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. The dissent
believed that "[t]he statute is ...entitled to a coherent reading as a whole.., by treating the
exemption for employment contracts as keeping pace with the expanded understanding of the
commerce power generally." Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 137 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in Justice Souter's dissent. Id. at 133.
23. The dissent asked us to do the following:
Compare The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 496, 498 (1908) (suggesting
"
that regulation of the employment relations of railroad employees actually engaged
Clause
Commerce
the
under
is
permissible
commerce"
in an operation of interstate
but that regulation of a railroad company's clerical force is not), with Hammer v.
Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251,271-76 (1918) (invalidating statute that had the "necessary
effect" of "regulat[ing] the hours of labor of children in factories and mines within
the States").
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent then concluded the
following:
[B]y using "engaged in" for the exclusion, Congress showed an intent to exclude to
the limit of its power to cover employment contracts in the first place, and it did so
just as clearly as its use of "involving commerce" showed its intent to legislate to the
hilt over commercial contracts at a more general level.
Id.
24. While noting that Circuit City involved the application of the FAA in a federal court,
rather than in a state court, the Court endorsed the continuing vitality of their decision in
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). It reiterated that Southland has not been
overruled by either judicial or legislative action. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122.
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II. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Court held that an
employee's prior submission of his claim to binding arbitration under
the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement does
not foreclose the employee's statutory right to a trial under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2' Further, the Court held that "[t]he
federal court should consider the employee's claim de novo."26 The
Court decided that "[t]he arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence
and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate."27
The Court, following an analysis of the goals of Title VII, 2s as
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,29 reached
the general conclusion that "federal courts have been assigned plenary
powers to secure compliance with Title VII,"30 and recognized that
Congress gave individuals a private right of action as an "essential
means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII."'" It found "no
suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior arbitral decision either
forecloses an individual's right to sue or divests federal courts of
jurisdiction. 3 2 Pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, "there
can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII."33
The Court reasoned by analogy that since legislative enactments

25. 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
26. Id. at 60.
27. Id. The Court declined to adopt specific standards for weighing an arbitral decision.
Instead, "this must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and
circumstances of each case." Id. at 60 n.21. The Court did note relevant factors: "IT]he
existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with
Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with
respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators."
Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994).
30. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 47.
33. Id. at 51. The Court did note the following:
[A] union may waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the
right to strike. These rights ... foster the processes of bargaining and properly may
be exercised or relinquished by the union.., to obtain economic benefits for union
members. Title VII ...concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right
to equal employment opportunities.
Id. (citations omitted).
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have intentionally provided for overlapping forums34 in bringing
discrimination claims, "an individual does not forfeit his private cause of
action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the
3
The
nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement."
36 forums-arbitration for the
Court envisioned tandem, complementary
vindication of collective contractual rights, and federal courts for the
vindication of individual statutory rights. 7 Either or both forums are
The Supreme Court has
available to an employee complainant.
extended this rule to cases implicating other statutes protecting
employees.39
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit, holding that "a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... can
be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
4
agreement in a securities registration application. " 0 In Gilmer, the
34. Id. at 47 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 111972) (EEOC)); 42 U.S.C. § 20005(c) (1994) (state and local agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. 111972) (federal courts)).
The Court noted that "in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a
later submission to another." Id. at 47-48.
35. Id. at 49.
36. The Court noted that "It]he relationship between the forums is complementary since
consideration of the claim by both forums may promote the policies underlying each." Id. at
50-51.
37. Arbitration would also be available for vindication of individual statutory rights if a
claimant opts to pursue their claim in only that forum.
38. Presumably, the former would be available at the initiation of the employer. The
Court noted that this does not give employees "two strings in his bow" because the employer
cannot bring a suit under Title VII because employers simply do not complain. Id. at 54. In
the arbitration context, other employment-related claims other than Title VII claims (e.g.,
wrongful discharge claims without any allegation of statutory civil rights discrimination) may
occur causing the employer to resort to arbitration of the claim as readily as the employee.
39. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981) (applying
Alexander in an overtime pay dispute under the Fair Labor Standards Act); McDonald v. City
of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984) (applying Alexander to a title 28 U.S.C. § 1983
claim).
40. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). Gilmer was
required by his employer to register as a securities representative with various exchanges
including the New York Stock Exchange. Id. Gilmer completed a registration application
entitled "Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer" (U-4). It
contained an agreement "to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy ... that is required to
be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which I
register." Id. (quoting Gilmer's registration application). Subsequently, Gilmer registered
with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). At issue in Gilmer, then, was the New York
Stock Exchange Rule 347 allowing for arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or
termination of employment of such registered representative." Id. The Court also noted:
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Supreme Court reached a different result than Alexander, but did not
explicitly overrule it. Instead, the Court distinguished the two cases.
First, Alexander involved arbitration in the context of a collectivebargaining agreement, while Gilmer involved arbitration in a non-union
context, specifically a registration application."
Second, Alexander
involved the issue of "whether arbitration of contract-based claims
precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims, 42 while
Gilmer involved the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
individual statutory claims.4 ' The Court's decision in Gilmer creates an
odd doctrinal anomaly by rejecting compulsory arbitration of statutory
employment discrimination claims for unionized employees under a
collective-bargaining agreement,44 while requiring arbitration of
statutory employment discrimination claims by non-union employees.4 5
"[Wie have held enforceable arbitration agreements relating to claims arising under the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b); the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; and § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
771(2)." Id.
41. The Court noted the "important concern ...[of] the tension between collective
representation and individual statutory rights" in Alexander was not present in Gilmer. Id. at
35. The Court quoted Alexander to support its view that "the interests of the individual
employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining
unit." Id. at 34 (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19). The Court, therefore, justified its
view that "Alexander and its progeny provide no basis for refusing to enforce Gilmer's
agreement to arbitrate his ADEA claim." Id. at 35.
42. Id.
43. The Court stated that "[s]ince the employees [in Alexander and its subsequent line of
cases] had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not
authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not
to preclude subsequent statutory actions." Id.
44. The Gilmer court reiterated the principles announced in Alexander. Since the Court
declined to overrule Alexander, most subsequent federal courts have denied compulsory
arbitration of discrimination claims where the arbitration provision is provided for in a
collective-bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th
Cir. 1997), Varner v. Nat'l Super Markets, 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996); Felt v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe, 60 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995). But see Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container Co., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996) (The Fourth
Circuit reviewed Alexander and its progeny and dispensed with the distinction between
agreements to arbitrate created "under a contract of employment growing out of securities
registration application, a simple employment contract, or a collective bargaining
agreement ....So long as the agreement is voluntary, it is valid, and ... it should be
enforced.").
45. Most circuits have followed the analysis in Gilmer. See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that compulsory
arbitration of ERISA claims by trustees is appropriate); Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc.,
56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that an arbitration clause in a U-4 securities registration form required arbitration of
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In Circuit City, the arbitration agreement was not a part of a
collective-bargaining agreement as in Alexander, nor was it a boilerplate
provision in a uniform securities registration application required by
many employers in the securities business as in Gilmer. Instead, Saint
Clair Adams, in a non-union context, signed an employment application
that contained a mandatory arbitration agreement drafted46 and used
only by Circuit City." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
48
arbitration agreement was contained in a contract of employment and,
statutory claims); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir.
1994) (holding that broker must arbitrate based on arbitration clause in NASD registration);
Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Son, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding broker must
arbitrate under registration agreements with NYSE and NASD). The Ninth Circuit and the
Seventh Circuit have interpreted Gilmer somewhat differently. InFarrandv. Lutheran Bros.,
993 F.2d 1253, 1254 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit, after reviewing the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure, concluded that arbitration under the U-4 form was not compulsory
because the NASD rules referred to by the U-4 form did not specifically require arbitration of
employment disputes. In PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Seventh Circuit in Farrandand held that
complainants under Title VII can only be forced to forego statutory remedies in favor of
arbitration if the complainant knowingly agreed to arbitrate those specific disputes. The
court noted that the U-4 form and the NASD arbitration clause failed to specifically mention
sex discrimination or discrimination generally as disputes subject to arbitration. Id. As such,
the court concluded that the plaintiff did not knowingly agree to arbitrate discrimination
claims. Id.
46. The arbitration agreement read: "[A]n employee cannot work at Circuit City
without signing the DRA (Dispute Resolution Agreement). If the employee signs the DRA
and then withdraws consent within three days, the employee 'will no longer be eligible for
employment at Circuit City.'" Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th
Cir. 1999).
47. Specifically, Adams completed a six-page application with Circuit City. Id. at 1071.
Two pages of the application were devoted to the DRA. Id. The DRA stated:
[I agree that I will settle any and all] previously unasserted claims, disputes or
controversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for
employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City,
exclusively by final and binding arbitrationbefore a neutral Arbitrator. By way of
example only, such claims include claims under federal, state, and local statutory or
common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments to the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and the law of
tort.
Id. at 1071 n.1.
48. The Ninth Circuit "defined an 'employment contract' as 'an agreement setting forth
'terms and conditions' of employment'." Id. at 1071 (citing Modzelewski v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Ninth Circuit, in reaching the conclusion the
DRA is an employment contract, disregarded Circuit City's disclaimer in the DRA that
stated, "I understand that neither this Agreement nor the Dispute Resolution Rules and
Procedures form a contract of employment between Circuit City and me .... [T]his
Agreement in no way alters the 'at-will' status of my employment." Id. The Ninth Circuit
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as such, the FAA was inapplicable.49 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
followed its decision in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.50 in which they held
that the FAA did not apply to labor and employment contracts." The
Ninth Circuit's holding conflicted with all other Courts of Appeals that
had addressed this issue." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve this conflict and held that "[s]ection 1 exempts from the FAA
only contracts of employment of transportation workers. 53
From this doctrinal line of case law, a number of clear rules emerge.
First, individual agreements, negotiated collectively, do not preclude
subsequent individual statutory claims in a judicial forum."' While most
courts have consistently applied Alexander to preclude compulsory
arbitration in union settings,5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
interpreted Gilmer and its progeny in a manner that effectively
overrules Alexander.5 6
Despite the Fourth Circuit's contrary
interpretation, the Supreme Court, in Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp.,7 has recently reaffirmed Alexander's general principle

that a general arbitration clause, collectively bargained, cannot waive an
individual employee's right to litigate a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). 8
Second, courts are instructed not to enforce any agreement,
negotiated collectively or individually, if "Congress itself has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
found the agreement was a condition precedent to employment and thus constituted a
"condition of employment" and therefore was a "contract of employment." Id. at 1071-72.
49. Id.
50. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
51. Id. at 1094 (holding that the FAA does not apply to labor or employment contracts).
52. See supra note 13 (listing relevant cases).
53. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
54. Circuit City does not explicitly overrule Alexander. To the contrary, the Court in
Circuit City is conspicuously silent on the subject.
55. See, e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. Nat'l
Super Markets, 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996); Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe, 60 F.3d
1416 (9th Cir. 1995).
56. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996). After examining related case law, the court found
insignificant the distinction between arbitration agreements contained in collectivebargaining agreements and those contained in individual employment agreements. Id. at
880-85. See also Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 959 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1997)
(adopting the Fourth Circuit's analysis).
57. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
58. Justice Scalia, without considering the effect on Gilmer, stated, "[A] union waiver of
employee rights to a federal judicial forum for employment-discrimination claims" would not
be "appropriate" if the waiver was not "clear and unmistakable." Id. at 82 n.2.
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rights at issue."'

9

This inherent conflict must be "discernible from the

text, history, or purposes of the statute. ' 6 Therefore, statutory rights
are presumptively arbitrable unless Congress has expressed a contrary
intention. 61 This presumption places the burden of persuasion of this
issue squarely on the shoulders of the party resisting enforcement of the
arbitration agreement.62 In Gilmer, the Supreme Court found no
"

inherent conflict between arbitration and the purpose of the Age
63
Gilmer made five
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
is inconsistent
arbitration
that
view
the
distinct arguments in support of

59. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). In
the context of an arbitration agreement negotiated individually, the Court relies on
Mitsubishi. In the context of arbitration agreements negotiated collectively, the Alexander
Court found that a waiver of employee rights before the fact "would defeat the paramount
congressional purpose behind Title VII." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51
(1973). It also found that "[t]he purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress
intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral
to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal." Id. at 56.
60. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). This
principle was not one announced by the Supreme Court soon after the enactment of the FAA
in 1925. Indeed, the Supreme Court, between 1953 and 1985, had circumscribed federal
policy favoring arbitration in cases implicating public law statutory rights. See, e.g., Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Supreme Court refused to require arbitration to resolve a claim
under the Securities Act of 1933 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1933)); Alexander, 415 U.S. 36.
Rather, this principle is one first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1985 and reaffirmed in
1986. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614 (noting a presumption in favor or
arbitrating public law rights in a case implicating the Sherman Antitrust Act.);
Shearson/American Express Inc., 482 U.S. 220 (upholding arbitration in a case implicating the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994)). It has been argued that
McMahon effectively, although not explicitly, overruled Wilko. See G. Richard Shell, The
Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397,414 (1988). Wilko and McMahon are distinguishable
in that Wilko's claim was under the 1933 Act and McMahon's claim was under the 1934 Act.
Nevertheless, both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act contain identical anti-waiver clauses that
prohibit waiver of "compliance with any provision" of the Act. Id. at 408 n.81 (citing the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 77n (1989)).
61. This presumption is consistent with and reflects the Court's view that "questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991) (quoting Moses
H. Cone Mem'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
62. The Court, in McMahon, held that the McMahons had the burden of persuasion to
demonstrate, through recourse to the Act's text, legislative history, and underlying purposes,
that Congress intended to "limit or prohibit" arbitration of 1934 claims. McMahon, 482 U.S.
at 227.
63. Citing McMahon, the Court examined the text, history and purposes of the ADEA
whether Congress intended to limit or prohibit arbitration. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
determine
to
26.
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The Supreme Court disposed of each of these

arguments in turn, despite contrary analysis in Alexander.65

64. First, Gilmer argued that "arbitration panels will be biased." Id. at 30. The Court
noted that the FAA contains protections against bias and, in the absence of specific
evidentiary showings of bias, the mere speculation of possible bias is insufficient to justify a
blanket refusal to enforce arbitration agreements. Id. at 30-31. Second, Gilmer argued the
more limited discovery permitted in arbitration than in judicial actions will make it difficult to
prove discrimination. Id. at 31. The Court noted generally that the limited discovery allowed
in arbitration simply "trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). In the specific context of
discovery, the Court noted "there ha[d] been no showing in this case that the NYSE discovery
provisions.., will prove insufficient to allow ADEA claimants ... a fair opportunity to
present their claims. Although those procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal
courts .... Id. Third, because arbitrators are not required in all cases to issue written
opinions, there will be "a lack of public knowledge of employers' discriminatory policies, an
inability to obtain effective appellate review, and a stifling of the development of the law."
Id. The Court found no merit in this argument because the NYSE rules require "all
arbitration awards [to] be in writing, and that the awards contain the names of the parties, a
summary of the issues in controversy, and a description of the award issued." Id. at 31-32.
"In addition, the award decisions are made available to the public." Id. at 32. Fourth,
"arbitration procedures cannot adequately further the purposes of the ADEA
because they
do not provide for broad equitable relief and class actions." Id. The Court noted that
arbitrators generally have the power to "fashion equitable relief" and that the NYSE rules
specifically authorize arbitrators to grant "damages and/or other relief." Id. Further, the
Court noted, "[A]rbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions
seeking class-wide and equitable relief." Id. Fifth, because "there often will be unequal
bargaining power between employers and employees," courts should refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements. Id. at 33.
The Court noted that "the FAA's purpose was to place arbitration agreements on
the same footing as other contracts. Thus, arbitration agreements are enforceable
,save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any
contract ....
[And] this claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution
in specific cases."
Id. at 33.
65. In Alexander, the Court considered the assumption that "arbitral processes are
commensurate with judicial processes." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56
(1974). The Court noted that "[w]e deem this supposition unlikely." Id. The Court then
noted, "[O]ther facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to judicial
processes in the protection of Title VII rights." Id. at 57. The Court considered the special
competence of arbitrators in claims involving industrial relations and the lesser competence
of arbitrators in the statutory and constitutional interpretation often required in Title VII
claims. Id. The Court also found:
[Tihe factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial
factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual
rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials,
such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable ....[And] "arbitrators have no
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individually, are
Third, individual agreements, negotiated
common-law
state
established
offend
unenforceable only when they
contract rules, impose unfair costs, or are acquired through "fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the
revocation of any contract.'" 66
The Court left open three avenues of attack on arbitration
agreements negotiated individually, notwithstanding Circuit City: (1)
The outcome and/or the arbitrator are biased; (2) the limitation of
certain procedural rights67 creates an inherent conflict between
68
of the statute at issue;
arbitration and the text, history and purposes
(3) the negotiating positions of the parties and/or the terms of the
contract violate some settled principle of contract law or constitute
deception or fraud.
III. AVENUES OF ATrACK ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. ArbitratorSelection Bias
Arbitrator selection provisions must be drafted to provide
0
In Gilmer v.
employees with a "neutral" decision-maker.
obligation ... to give their reasons for an award."
Id. at 57-58 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am.v. Enter.Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 574,
598 (1960)) (alterations in original); see also Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th
Cir. 1972) (setting forth a standard for judicial deference to arbitrator decisions under Title
VII); Paul E. Mirengoff, Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitrator'sDecisions in Title VII Cases,
26 STAN. L. REV. 421 (1974).

66. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)). The FAA's coverage provision in section 2 explicitly provides for
enforcing arbitration agreements except in cases where the agreement violates a legal
principle "at law or equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1999).
67. Examples of procedural rights that might be limited by arbitration include, among
others, discovery, jury trial, and probing appellate review. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
68. See infra Part III.B.
69. See infra Part III.C.
70. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has discussed several procedural
requirements to ensure that the arbitral forum meets certain fairness minimums. Cole v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court held that, to be
enforceable, such agreements must, at a minimum, establish an "arbitration arrangement"
that:
(1) [Plrovides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery,
(3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would
otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either
unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to
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Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,7 the Supreme Court refused to "indulge

the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a
proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,
conscientious and impartial arbitrators.""2 The court specifically noted
that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration rules provide
protections against biased panels.73 The court also noted that once there
is a "final" decision, the FAA also protects against bias by providing
that courts may overturn arbitration decisions "[w]here there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators."74 Thus, there is a
safeguard in place to protect a selection procedure that appears neutral

on its face, but which, in actuality, produces an arbitrator who was not
neutral in his or her decision-making.75
To date, courts have provided little guidance regarding the minimum
requirements for arbitrator selection procedures in a mandatory
prospective environment."

In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., the

California Supreme Court refused to enforce a contract's arbitration
panel provision because the stipulated panel was biased and the
selection provision was, therefore, unconscionable. 7

The contract

between musicians and a music promoter required submission of every
dispute "for determination by the [American Federation of

Musicians] ...and such determination shall be conclusive, final and

the arbitration forum.
Id.
71. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
72. Id. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473
U.S. 614,
634 (1984)).
73. Id. at 30-31 (citing 2 CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide 1$ 2608 (Rule
608),
2609 (Rule 609), and 2610 (Rule 610) (1991)). "The rules require, for example,
that the
parties be informed of the employment histories of the arbitrators, and that they
be allowed
to make further inquiries into the arbitrators' backgrounds." Id. "[E]ach party
is allowed one
peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause." Id. "[T]he arbitrators
are
required to disclose any 'circumstances which might preclude [them] from
rendering an
objective and impartial determination."' Id. (quoting NYSE Guide 1 2610,
at 4315 (Rule
610)).
74. Gilmer,500 U.S. at 30-31 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1994)).
75. A post-decision challenge of arbitrator bias will not be discussed here. ELKOURI
&
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (Marlin M. Volz & Edward
P. Goggin eds. 5th ed.
1997), presents excellent coverage of this issue and the entire arbitration forum
in general.
76. See Martin H., PrivatizingJustice-But By How Much: Questions Gilmer
Did Not
Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL. 589 (2001) for a recent scholarly
discussion of
concerns to be addressed.
77. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
78. See id. at 173-77.
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binding upon the parties." 79 The California Supreme Court, recognizing
the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, remanded the case back to
the trial court to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to agree on
a suitable arbitrator.8
The court acknowledged that the parties do have considerable
leeway in structuring alternative dispute resolution arrangements and
that the parties may agree to "arrangements which vary to some extent
from the dead-center of 'neutrality.' 81 Nevertheless, the court found
that the contract's designation of the musicians' union as the final,
binding decision-maker was "so inimical to fundamental notions of
fairness as to require non enforcement. 82
The Graham court took particular interest in a decision from New
York and agreed with that court's reasoning that a contract designating
3
one of the parties as the arbitrator of all contractual disputes is illusory.
79. Id.at 168.
80. Id. at 180. "[Flailing such agreement, the court should on petition of either party
appoint the arbitrator. In the absence of an agreement or petition to appoint, the court
should proceed to a judicial determination of the controversy." Id. (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 176. "As the United States Supreme Court has said in a related context,
'Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settlement arrangements.. . , but it was
anticipated, we are sure, that the contractual machinery would operate within some minimum
levels of integrity."' Id. (quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976))
(alterations in original).
82. Graham, 623 P.2d. at 174. The court reasoned as follows:
Although our review of the record has disclosed nothing which would indicate that
A.F. of M. procedures operate to deny any party a fair opportunity to present his
position prior to decision, we are of the view that the 'minimum levels of integrity'
which are requisite to a contractual arrangement for the nonjudicial resolution of
disputes are not achieved by an arrangement which designates the union of one of
the parties as the arbitrator of disputes arising out of employment-especially when,
as here, the arrangement is the product of circumstances indicative of adhesion.
Id. at 177.
83. According to Graham, the court in In re Cross & Brown Co., 4 A.D.2d 501, 167
N.Y.S.2d 573 (1957) considered the validity of a provision in an employment contract
establishing the employer as the arbitrator and the arbitrator/employer's decision as final.
Graham, 623 P.2d at 175. Quoting Cross, the Graham court stated:
[T]he provision [was found] unconscionable; enforcement was denied. "A wellrecognized principle of 'natural justice' is that a man may not be a judge in his own
cause. Irrespective of any proof of actual bias or prejudice, the law presumes that a
party to a dispute cannot have that disinterestedness and impartiality necessary to
act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity regarding that controversy. This absolute
disqualification to act rests upon sound public policy. Any other rule would be
repugnant to a proper sense of justice."
Graham, 623 P.2d at 175 (quoting In re Cross & Brown Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d at 575).
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The Grahamcourt reasoned:
We have also indicated that the same result would follow, and for

the same reasons, when the designated arbitrator is not the party
himself but one whose interests are so allied with those of the
party that, for all practical purposes, he is subject to the same
disabilities which prevent the party himself from serving. '
Other than this extreme example, the reported cases offer no other
guidance on selection bias that would create a per se violation. Courts,
on a case-by-case basis, will review arbitrator bias arguments and
determine what "minimum levels of integrity" exist to justify
enforcement." Whether the courts will scrutinize arbitrator selection
procedures more carefully in the context of mandatory prospective
contracts remains to be seen.
In Cole v. Burns International Security Services,86 the D.C. Circuit
enforced a compulsory, prospective arbitration agreement that provided
for the appointment of a neutral arbitrator through the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) and for the arbitration hearing to be
conducted in accordance with AAA rulesY While the court never
explicitly stated it, using an experienced "neutral" third-party
84. Graham, 623 P.2d at 177. The Graham court reasoned:
In view of these considerations we think it must be concluded that a contractual
provision designating the union of one of the parties to the contract as the arbitrator
of all disputes arising thereunder-including those concerning the compensation due
under the contract-does not achieve the 'minimum levels of integrity' which we
must demand of a contractually structured substitute for judicial proceedings.
Id. at 178. While Graham declared unconscionable an arbitration provision designating a
party himself or one closely allied with the party as arbitrator, Graham did not "limit the
power of contracting parties to designate arbitrators who, with the knowledge of the parties,
may have an interest in the dispute or who sustain relationship to a party which would
otherwise disqualify the arbitrator from serving." Id. at 175 (quoting In re Cross & Brown
Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d at 576).
85. Id. at 176.
86. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
87. Id. at 1482. The court found the arbitration provision at issue valid because it:
(1) [PIrovides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery,
(3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would
otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either
unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to
the arbitration forum.
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organization to appoint the arbitrator seems to prevail against a prehearing selection bias argument."
In three recent cases involving an arbitration provision crafted by
Ryan's Family Steak Houses," courts have expressed concerns regarding
9
the potential for bias in the selection of the arbitration panels. ' In these
cases, the employer (Ryan's) had entered into a contract with
Employment Dispute Services, Inc. (EDS) to have EDS provide an

arbitration forum for all employment related disputes between Ryan's
and its employees.9 EDS Rules called for a panel of three adjudicators
to be chosen by the parties from pools of potential arbitrators selected
by EDS alone.92

The Sixth Circuit expressed "serious reservations" as to whether this

93
arbitral forum was suitable for the resolution of statutory claims. The

Seventh Circuit discussed the trial court's concerns with the EDS

88. The FAA always protects against actual bias by providing that courts may overturn
arbitration decisions "[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators." 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
89. Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001); Floss v.
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); Geiger v. Ryan's Family
Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
90. The courts ultimately refused enforcement on the basis of state contract law and the
lack of a valid exchange of mutual consideration under the totality of circumstances. Penn,
269 F.3d at 759-60; Floss, 211 F.3d at 315-16; Geiger, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1000-02; see also infra
Part III.C (discussing state contract law and arbitration agreements).
91. In Penn, the court hypothesized that the parties may have created the arrangement
the way they did "for fear that the Supreme Court might use Circuit City to strike down or
restrict" mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. Id. at 761. And
the court noted, "[11f so, the half-life of the kind of system EDS has been using may be rather
short at this point." Id.
92. See EDSI Rules, Art. IX, §§ 1, 2. One pool consisted of supervisors or managers of
an employer signatory to EDSI Agreements, the second pool was composed of non-exempt
employees who are signatory to EDSI Agreements, and the third pool was made up of
attorneys, retired judges, or other competent professional persons not associated with either
party. Geiger, 134 F.Supp. 2d at 990, 991.
93. Floss, 211 F.3d at 314. The court reasoned:
Specifically, the neutrality of the forum is far from clear in light of the uncertain
relationship between Ryan's and EDSI. Floss and Daniels suggest that EDSI is
biased in favor of Ryan's and other employers because it has a financial interest in
maintaining its arbitration service contracts with employers. Though the record
does not clearly reflect whether EDSI, in contrast to the American Arbitration
Association, operates on a for-profit basis, the potential for bias exists. In light of
EDSI's role in determining the pool of potential arbitrators, any such bias would
render the arbitral forum fundamentally unfair.
Id. (citation omitted).
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arbitration selection provisions at length.94 The court observed that,
unlike the AAA, EDS handles only employment arbitration, "so
essentially all of its funding comes from employers. 9 5 In addition to this

alleged financial "incentive to tilt its arbitration panels in favor of the
companies that employ it," the employee argued that EDS "has
substantial opportunity to shade its procedures in favor of employers."9 6
The Seventh Circuit stated that the district court "was particularly
troubled by the fact that EDS, which the court saw as essentially an
alter-ego for the employer, had complete control over the lists of
potential arbitrators. ,97

Courts are willing to consider arguments that the arbitrator selection
procedures are biased against employees. An employer may not
mandate a selection procedure that establishes either party, or one
closely allied with either party, as the arbitrator. The latter category
includes companies, other than an established experienced neutral

professional organization such as the AAA, with which the employer
has contracted for the selection of the arbitrator. An employee must
raise the selection bias argument before agreeing to proceed to the
arbitration hearing. If not, the pre-hearing selection bias argument will
be waived.98 When a court finds an arbitrator selection procedure
94. Id. at 753. The court elaborated:
In the district court, Penn argued that the EDS arbitration system is inherently
biased against employees .... Although Penn raised objections to several aspects of
the EDS system, the overarching theme of his challenge was that EDS was no more
than a straw-man for the employers who fund it, and thus, presumably, any award
they rendered would reflect the kind of 'evident partiality' that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(2), recognizes as a reason for
unenforceability.
Id. at 756.
95. Id. "In addition, the employers who contract with EDS are repeat players, and if an
employer becomes dissatisfied with EDS's services, EDS stands to lose a substantial amount
of business. Id.
96. Id. at 756-57. As an example, EDS has complete control over the names that appear
on the lists for both the employer's arbitrator and the employee's arbitrator. Id. at 756.
97. Id. at 757.
98. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). The court
stated:
On the other hand, we also held in Nghiem that plaintiffs who "voluntarily initiate
binding arbitration" of their Title VII claims are "bound by the arbitrator's
decision .... Once a claimant submits to the authority of the arbitrator and pursues
arbitration," we explained, "he cannot suddenly change his mind and assert lack of
authority."
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biased, one important question remains: Will the court correct the bias
by appointing an acceptable arbitrator, or will the court invalidate the

entire arbitration agreement?99

B. Inherent Conflicts Between Arbitrationand Civil Rights Statutes
1. Arbitration and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
On November 21, 1991, President George H.W. Bush signed into
law the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA 1991).'w Section 118 of CRA

1991 states in part, "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including...
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or

provisions of Federal law amended by this title.''
The "Acts or
provisions of Federal law" include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,02 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,1"3 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967," 4 and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.05
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp. was argued on January 14,
1991 and decided on May 13, 1991.' 6 Gilmer, therefore, pre-dates the
final passage of CRA 1991 by six months. An interpretive problem
arises because Gilmer was decided after CRA 1991 was drafted and
reported out of committee, but before President Bush signed it into law.
Congress "encouraged" arbitration among other alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms only "where appropriate'0 and to the "extent
Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189 (citation omitted) (quoting Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d
1437,1439-40 (9th Cir. 1994)).
99. See Infra Part III.C.4 (discussing severability).
100. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
101. Id. § 118.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994). The text of § 118 is identical to language in the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See § 12212. The ADA was enacted first because
President Bush had vetoed, in 1990, an earlier version of CRA 1991 that he had signed.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1994).
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 710-797b (1994).
106. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
107. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). The
Ninth Circuit concluded that "where appropriate" and "to the extent authorized by law"
impose two separate limitations. Id. It believes "'where appropriate' ... would appear to
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authorized by law."''
Courts are split as to whether the "extent
authorized by law" codifies Gilmer. Some courts believe the "plain
language" of section 118 is a codification of Gilmer, and no further
inquiry into legislative intent is necessary or proper."" Other courts
believe section 118 is ambiguous,"' and thus inquiry into legislative
mean where arbitration furthers the purpose and objective of the Act-by affording victims
of discrimination an opportunity to present their claims in an alternative forum, a forum that
they find desirable-not by forcing an unwanted forum upon them." Id. at 1194.
108. There is some disagreement among courts of appeals as to the meaning of "to the
extent authorized by law." Some circuits hold that this provision refers to the FAA and
courts should enforce any arbitration agreement since the FAA expresses a liberal "federal
policy favoring arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983); see Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing
Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 1998)). Other Circuits hold that the
provision refers to the case law establishing the conditions and limitations on arbitration of
statutory violations under the civil rights acts amended by CRA 1991. See Duffield, 144 F.3d
at 1193-96.
109. One scholar has found that "[tihe cases addressed by the Act are: (1) Ward's Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio; (2) Patterson v. McLean Credit Union; (3) Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins; (4) Martin v. Wilks; (5) EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO); (6)
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.; (7) Library of Congress v. Shaw; and (8) West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc., v. Casey." Donald R. Livingston, 23 STETSON LAW REVIEW 53
(1993) (citations omitted). It is unlikely that Congress considered Gilmer since section 118 is
identical to section 513 of the ADA enacted six months before Gilmer. If section 118 was
simply borrowed from the ADA without significant deliberation, compulsory, prospective
arbitration agreements would not be "authorized by law" unless "completely voluntary."
H.R.REP. NO. 558, 101st Cong. 2d (1990). For a discussion of different standards of
voluntariness, see Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 669 (2001)
(examining the standards of knowing, voluntary and intentional for waivers of Seventh
Amendment jury trials); Karen Halverson, Arbitrationand the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 445, 448 (1999) (arguing that the language "where appropriate" in section 118
should be read to require "a heightened voluntariness test, similar to the requirement for a
'knowing and voluntary' waiver specified in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act").
110. Those courts who endorse this view of section 118 note that at the time CRA 1991
was signed into law, the Supreme Court had decided Gilmer, which approved a compulsory,
prospective arbitration agreement under the ADEA. Their argument is that Gilmer
"authorized by law" compulsory arbitration of all employment discrimination claims because
of its passage after the decision and because Title VII is similar to the ADEA. Compulsory,
prospective arbitration agreements, therefore, are "encouraged" by Congress in section 118.
No extensive analysis of legislative history is proper because a plain language reading of
section 118 is sufficient. See Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 364 (rejecting the contention that
Congress intended to preclude Title VII claims from the FAA); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 163 F.3d 53, 63 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding "neither the language of the
statute nor the legislative history demonstrates an intent in the 1991 CRA to preclude
prospective arbitration agreements.").
111. Congress amended the ADEA through the Older Worker's Benefit Protection Act
of 1990 after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gilmer. The OWPA requires that all
waivers must be "knowing and voluntary." 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (1994). A waiver is not
"knowing and voluntary" if its waives "rights or claims that may arise after the date the
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intent is both necessary and proper." As a result of that inquiry,
section 118 should be viewed as a codification of Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co."'

Circuit courts of appeals, depending on their interpretive bent, have
reached different conclusions as to the compatibility of compulsory
arbitration agreements and the civil rights statutes. The Ninth Circuit,
in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.," examined the text and
legislative history of CRA 1991"' and concluded that section 118
effectively nullified Gilmer. The court, therefore, refused to enforce a
compulsory, prospective Form U-4 arbitration agreement."' The Third
waiver is executed." 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (1994). The Supreme Court, in Gilmer, did not
address this new statutory language.
112. Those courts adhering to this view of section 118 note that Gilmer was decided on
May 13, 1991, after CRA 1991 was drafted and after it was reported out of committee. They
note that Committee Reports are considered by the Supreme Court as the authoritative
source of legislative intent and the view of the House Committee on Education and Labor
was that section 118 codified Gardner-Denver and explicitly rejected the conclusions that
were eventually reached by the Supreme Court in Gilmer. See Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that Congress specifically
rejected a proposal allowing employers to enforce compulsory arbitration agreements). Prior
to Gilmer, "[Gardner-Denver] was widely interpreted as prohibiting any form of compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims." Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir.
1994); see also Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1188 ("The circuit courts read Gardner-Denver as sending
a simple message: Title VII is different.").
113. As evidence that Congress intended section 118 as a codification of GardnerDenver are comments during the floor debates by congressmen. See 137 Cong. Rec. H9530
(daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (During the debate immediately
preceding the Act's passage, the Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor
stated that section 118 was "intended to be consistent with decisions such as Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.....No approval whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Gilbert [sic] v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., or any application or extension of it
to Title VII."); 137 Cong. Rec. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(citation omitted) (Section 118 encourages arbitration only "where parties knowingly and
voluntarily elect to use those methods."); 137 Cong. Rec. H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Hyde) (Section 118 encourages arbitration only where, "the parties
knowingly and voluntarily elect to submit to such procedures.").
114. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1988) cert denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998).
115. The Ninth Circuit engaged in this analysis because the Supreme Court in Gilmer
reaffirmed the notion that the burden of demonstrating that "Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of a judicial forum for [TitleVII] claims" is on the plaintiff. Id. at 1190 (quoting
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26). The court continued, "If such an intention exists, it will be
discoverable in the text of [the Act at issue], its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict'
between arbitration and the [Act's] underlying purpose." Id. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26)
(alteration in original).
116. Following an extensive analysis of legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit, in Duffield,
found that "Congress concluded that all such mandatory agreements as conditions of
employment were, at the very least, 'inappropriate' and thus unenforceable." Id. at 1196.
Under this view, Gilmer's acceptance of compulsory, prospective agreements to arbitrate may
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Circuit, in Seus v. John Nuveen & Co.,"7 enforced a compulsory,

prospective Form U-4 arbitration agreement by ignoring legislative
history,"' refusing to read any limitation into section 118,"' and finding
section 118 "evinces a clear Congressional intent to encourage
arbitration of Title VII and ADEA claims."120

2. Statutory Right to a Jury Trial
Prior to CRA 1991, jury trials as well as compensatory and punitive
damages were not available in Title VII actions.' The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 amends 42 U.S.C. § 198112 and provides that "a complaining
party" alleging intentional discrimination under sections 703, 704, and
717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-,' section 102 of the ADA,'24 and
section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973' z may demand a jury trial
and seek compensatory and punitive damages. 2 6 CRA 1991 places caps

not be "appropriate" under section 118 of CRA 1991.
117. 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
118. "[N]o amount of commentary from individual legislators or committees would
justify a court in reaching the result [sought by plaintiffs]." Id. at 182.
119. Id. (finding any such limitation would be an "implied repealer" of the FAA).
120. Id. See also Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999).
121. Instead, damages in Title VII actions had been limited to equitable remedies such
as backpay, frontpay, retroactive seniority, injunction, etc. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)
(1994).
122. Congress accomplished its legislative purposes by amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to
create a new section 1981(a) rather than amending each statute separately. The core
substantive provision of section 1981 remains unchanged by CRA 1991. Section 1981
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity by guaranteeing that "[a]ll
persons.., shall have the same right.., to make and enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by
white citizens." Unlike Title VII, section 1981 has always offered procedural and remedial
advantages to claimants. Section 1981 offers claimants the option of a jury trial and
compensatory and punitive damages without statutory limitation caps. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994). Section 1981 also does not limit backpay to two years, and does not require nor
permit claimants to first employ the EEOC's administrative procedures before bringing a
private lawsuit and applies to businesses with less than fifteen employees. In 1989, the reach
of section 1981 was dramatically limited by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Pattersonv.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The Court held that section 1981 prohibited
racial discrimination during the initial formation of a contract, but did not govern
discriminatory post-formation conduct.
Id. at 171.
Congress, in section 1981a(b),
reestablished the pre-Patterson rule. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454 (1975).
123. 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e-2 to 2000e-3 (1994).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. 111990).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. V 1981).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (1994). The Act also directs courts not to make juries
aware of the caps. Id.

2002]

CIRCUIT CITY V. ADAMS

on compensatory'27 and punitive'2 damage awards contingent on an
employer's number of employees'29

In claims brought under statutes amended by CRA 1991, a
submission to arbitration will constitute a waiver of claimants' statutory
right to have their claim decided by a jury.' 3 When considering the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, courts have not yet had to
address the issue of whether and under what circumstances such
agreements can and will act as jury-trial waivers."' Instead, most courts
have reached their decisions by emphasizing that arbitration is
"favored," 32

interpreting

arbitration

agreements

broadly,'33

and

interpreting defenses to arbitration narrowly."'
127. Compensatory damages include "damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional
pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses." § 1981a(b)(3).
128. Punitive damages are awarded in cases of intentional discrimination where the
defendant has acted, "with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual." § 1981a(b)(1). Punitive damages are imposed on parties
'other than a government, government agency or political subdivision." Id.
129. § 1981 a(b)(3). The term "complaining party" includes the EEOC, the Attorney
General, and private litigants. § 1981a(d)(1).
130. For a thorough analysis of waiver requirements under the Seventh Amendment, see
Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 669 (2001).
131. Courts have not intentionally dodged the waiver issue. Instead, they have failed to
address this issue because no claimant has raised the issue in the trial court.
132. In Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983),
the Supreme Court noted:
[Qluestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration . ... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.
Id.
133. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991) (holding
that ADEA claims are subject to arbitration); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that securities fraud cases are arbitrable); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (noting that the
.parties' intentions.., are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability"); Williams v.
Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that ERISA claims are arbitrable); Gregory v.
Electro-Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382 (11th Cir. 1996) (interpreting broadly arbitration
provision as covering claims of fraud, deceit, and tort.); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co.,
72 F.3d 50, 53-54 (7th Cir. 1995) (interpreting arbitration provision to cover statutory as well
as contractual claims); Jones v. Fujitsu Network Communications Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 688
(N.D. Tex. 1999) (upholding arbitrability of Family and Medical Leave Act claims.)
134. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25 (noting that defenses such as laches,
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These cases, therefore, offer noguidance in answering the important
question of whether a waiver of a claimant's right to a jury trial through
the enforcement of a compulsory, prospective agreement to arbitrate
creates a conflict with the text, intent, or purpose of the civil rights
statutes.'35 Is it "appropriate", under section 118 to allow parties, whom
Congress has identified,"6 to demand, as a condition of employment, a
prospective waiver of the jury trial Congress clearly and carefully
37
provided?

Congress listed, among its formal findings, that "legislation is
necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment.' 38 Congress's purpose was "to provide
appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful
harassment in the workplace."'39 Congress, in CRA 1991, explicitly
provided the right to a jury trial as one of these additional protections.'"

Prior to CRA 1991, claims of intentional discrimination were heard and
decided by a judge. Congress did not extend the right to a jury trial to
cases alleging disparate impact. By distinguishing intentional claims
from disparate impact claims, affording only intentional claims the
option of a jury trial, Congress acknowledged the very different natures
of the two claims' respective litigation.'
estoppel, and waiver are subject to a narrow interpretation); Ex parte Smith, 736 So. 2d 604,
610 (Ala. 1999) ("[C]ourts will not lightly infer a waiver of arbitration rights.").
135. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
136. Congress, in section 1981a, reaffirmed the judicial view announced in Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) that section 1981 extends to public and private employers alike.
See 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(2) (1994). But see § 1981a(b)(1) (exempting governmental actors
from punitive damages).
137. See § 1981a(c) (1994). See also Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d
1182, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting the "mild paradox" of Congress strengthening existing
protections while endorsing compulsory, prospective waivers of those same protections.) In
Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997), Chief Judge Posner noted this
paradox in a collective-bargaining context and recognized that arbitration agreements,
imposed without employees' consent, conflict with the individual's statutory right to a jury
trial. Id. Judge Posner also recognized that compulsory, prospective arbitration agreements
pose similar, yet "attenuated," consent problems. Id. at 364.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Congressional Findings).
139. § 1981a (1994 ed.) (Purposes of 1991 Amendments).
140. § 1981a(c).
141. Disparate treatment means that an employer treats some people less favorably than
others because of their protected class status (race, gender, ethnicity, disability, age, etc.).
Proof of discriminatory motive is crucial. Such a motive may be inferred from statistical
evidence and from unexplained differences in treatment. Disparate treatment can be
distinguished from disparate impact. In impact cases, a facially neutral rule, practice, or
device disproportionately disadvantages minority members and is not justified by business
necessity. Proof of a discriminatory motive is not required. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power

2002]

CIRCUIT CITY V. ADAMS

In disparate impact claims, the plaintiff challenges the employer's

use of facially -neutral -selection criteria. without, being justified by
business necessity; this criteria disproportionately. 'disadvantages
protected class members." 2 The plaintiff's. case relies almost completely
on the precision and analysis of statistical data.' . In claims' of
intentional discrimination, the plaintiff relies more on assessments of
character and credibility. 144

The finder -of fact, on the basis of

Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971) with McDonnell Douglas v. Green Corp., 411 U.S. 792,
802-06 (1973).
142. See' Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (challenging height and weight
requirements for correctional counselors); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975) (challenging the use of standardized tests for entry-level skilled positions); Griggs, 401
U.S. 424 (challenging a high school degree requirement and an I.Q. test for employee
transfers).
143. In his or her prima facie case, a plaintiff must "show that there are statistical
disparities in the employer's work force ...[and is] responsible for isolating and identifying
the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities." Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,656 (1989) (quoting Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) may
be the best statistical technique to study the influence of a number of continuous and discrete
variables when the dependent variable is discrete. An ANOVA analysis measures the
percentage influence of each independent variable (e.g., sex of candidate, race of candidate,
score on standardized measure, years of experience, educational attainment, etc.) on the
discrete dependant variable (e.g., hired or not, promoted or not, discharged or not, etc.)
When the dependent variable is continuous, multiple regression may be the preferable
statistical technique. In a regression analysis, the relationship between the dependent
variable (e.g., salary) and each independent variable (e.g., sex of candidate, race of candidate,
score on standardized measure, years of experience, educational attainment, etc.) is
determined by holding the other independent variables constant. The measure of the
relationship is the regression coefficient of the independent variable. See Frankling M.
Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 705-06 (1980);
David Baldus & James W.L. Cole, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980 & Supp.
1983).
144. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) (noting that
plaintiff was apparently told that the teller position involved "a lot of money... for blacks to
have to count"); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding a supervisor
commented that "'[c]olored people are hired to clean because they clean better,' or words to
that effect."). Cases of intentional discrimination are commonly referred to as "pretext"
cases. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 804-05. In such cases, plaintiffs, in their prima facie cases, need only establish four,
easy factual predicates. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54; McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 904-05.
If successful, the defendant, in rebuttal, must merely produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-57; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. 802-03. Following rebuttal, plaintiff, in surrebuttal has the opportunity to
persuade the factfinder that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason produced by the
defendant is unworthy of belief and is a "pretext" to disguise intentional discrimination.
Pretext is established by adducing evidence of the employer's past discrimination against the
claimant, statistical evidence showing a pattern or practice of discrimination by the employer
and testimonial evidence of bad comments. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; McDonnell Doublas,
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circumstantial and/or statistical evidence, arrives at a finding of
intentional discrimination inferentially."" By only offering a jury trial in
cases of intentional discrimination, Congress determined that ordinary
people should make judgments of character and credibility, not
professional judges.'" Arbitrators are professional judges.'" To permit
employers, by fiat, to compel arbitration of claims alleging intentional
discrimination, flies directly in the face of any rational intent of
Congress as it robs a claimant of the option of a jury trial Congress so
deliberately and explicitly provided.
3. Statutory Right to EEOC Protection
The Supreme Court recently considered whether limiting the
remedies available in an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
enforcement claim creates an inherent conflict between arbitration and
civil rights statutes, specifically the ADA, in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.'" The Court faced the
question of "whether an agreement between an employer and an
employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes bars the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from pursuing victimspecific judicial relief.., in an enforcement action alleging... [a
violation] of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)." 49 A
majority of the Supreme Court held that it did not and reversed the
411 U.S. at 904-05. Based on the totality of the evidence, the factfinder either believes the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason advanced by the employer or believes it is merely a
pretext disguising intentional discrimination. See generally McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
792 (1973).
145. It is never directly proven that the employer intentionally discriminated because
there is neither a "smoking gun" nor admission by the defendant. Instead, intentional
discrimination is inferred when the plaintiff successfully eliminates all of the common
legitimate justifications for the adverse employment decision, and the defendant fails to
produce evidence of a less obvious legitimate justification for the decision. See Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas formula
does not require direct proof of discrimination).
146. As a historical note, CRA 1991 immediately followed the allegations of sexual
harassment made by Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation
hearings. Based on the allegedly insensitive inquiries of male senators, many women felt the
Senators "just don't get it." Women were elected in unprecedented numbers during the next
election cycle. The issue of harassment, defined as a form of intentional discrimination, was
met with a general skepticism of status quo views held by powerful men. Congress may have
addressed the problem by providing jury trials.
147. Not only are they professionals, they are often also experts. Decision-making by a
jury of one's peers is the antithesis of decision-making by a professional expert.
148. 122 S. Ct. 754,758 (2002).
149. Id. at 758.
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decision of the Fourth Circuit. The Court found the Fourth Circuit's

distinction between injunctive and victim-specific relief specious.. and
rejected their balancing of the competing policies of the ADA and the
FAA. 5' The Court's holding resolved a split among Courts of Appeals

regarding the EEOC's pursuit of injunctive and victim-specific
remedies.'52 The EEOC is left where the Court found it. It retains its

ability to pursue the full range of statutory remedies in the federal
courts to enforce civil rights laws.
The Court analyzed the statutory text of Title VII, as amended, and
the subsequent case law 53 addressing Congress's grant of enforcement
power to the EEOC to reach its conclusion that "no language in the
statute or in... cases suggest[] that.., an arbitration agreement
between private parties materially changes the EEOC's statutory

function or the remedies that are otherwise available."'54 To justify this
conclusion,

the Court first found

that

Congress, in

the

1972

Amendments to Title VII, "created a system in which the EEOC was

150. The Court noted that "while punitive damages benefit the individual employee,
they also serve an obvious public function in deterring future violations .... [I]njunctive
relief, although not seemingly 'victim-specific,' can be seen as more closely tied to the
employees' injury than to any public interest." Id. at 764-65.
151. See generally id. at 762-65. Specifically, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning that:
When the EEOC seeks "make-whole" relief for a charging party, the federal policy
favoring enforcement of private arbitration agreements outweighs the EEOC's right
to proceed in federal court because in that circumstance, the EEOC's public interest
in minimal, as the EEOC seeks primarily to vindicate private, rather than public,
interests. On the other hand, when the EEOC is pursuing large-scale injunctive
relief, the balance tips in favor of EEOC enforcement efforts in federal court
because the public interest dominates the EEOC's actions.
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999). But see EEOC v. Frank's
Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1998). The court stated: "[L]imiting the
EEOC to the pursuit of injunctive and not monetary relief.., would severely impede its
ability to protect the public interest against unlawful employment discrimination, and would
effectively eradicate the efforts of Congress to provide meaningful enforcement powers to the
EEOC." Id. at 466.
152. Compare Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (noting that the EEOC's
independent statutory authority to pursue both equitable and monetary remedies is not
affected by an employee's arbitration agreement with an employer), with EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the EEOC may pursue injunctive
relief but not monetary relief in the federal courts), and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000) (denying the EEOC power to pursue
monetary relief.).
153. See generally Waffle House, 122 S.Ct. at 759-61.
154. Id. at 761.
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intended 'to bear the primary burden of litigation.''' 5 5 Second, the
Court noted that Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, "amended
Title VII to allow the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
by a 'complaining party."'
The term "complaining party" includes
"both private plaintiffs and the EEOC,'7 and the amendments apply to
ADA claims as well."' Third, the Court examined the text of the FAA
and found it inapplicable to EEOC enforcement actions.59
4. Costs, Access and Deterrence
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court
stated, "So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.""' The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Cole v. Burns International

Security Services,6' considered a prospective arbitration agreement that

was imposed on employees as a condition of employment. The court
framed the relevant question as "can an employer require an employee

to arbitrate all disputes and also require the employee to pay all or part
of the arbitrator's fees."' 62 The court concluded that:

155. Id. at 760 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980)).
In relation to possible remedies, the Court cites 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994), which
states, "[T]he courts may enjoin... [employers] from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." Id. The majority dismissed the
respondent's and dissent's argument that "appropriate" limits remedies and "may recover"
directs courts, not the EEOC, to determine appropriate relief as disingenuous and "not the
natural reading of the text." Waffle House, 122 S.Ct. at 763. It found that 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(a)(1) (1994) explicitly authorizes compensatory and punitive damages and reaffirms
the court's discretion in fashioning relief as "warranted by the facts of that case." Id.
156. Id. (citing § 1981a(a)(1)).
157. Id. (citing § 1981a(d)(1)(A)).
158. Id. (citing § 1981a(a)(2), (d)(1)(B)).
159. Specifically, the Court stated the following:
[N]othing in the statute authorizes a court to compel arbitration of any issues, or by
any parties, that are not already covered in the agreement. The FAA does not
mention enforcement by public agencies; it ensures the enforceability of private
agreements to arbitrate, but otherwise does not purport to place any restriction on a
nonparty's choice of a judicial forum.
Id. at 762.
160. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (alteration in original)).
161. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
162. Id. at 1468.
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[A]n employee can never be required, as a condition of
employment, to pay an arbitrator's compensation in order to
secure the resolution of statutory claims under Title VII.... The
only way that an arbitration agreement of the sort at issue here
can be lawful is if the employer assumes163 responsibility for the
payment of the arbitrator's compensation.
While the D.C. Court of Appeals in Cole announced a per se rule in
statutory cases, 64 other courts of appeals have adopted a case-by-case
approach. 65
In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,66 the
Supreme Court conceded that "the existence of large arbitration costs
could preclude a litigant.., from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum."1 7 The Court endorsed a case-bycase approach' 68 and placed the burden of persuasion on the issue of
163. Id. The arbitration agreement in Cole did not require employees to pay the
arbitrator's compensation. Rather, it was silent in this regard. Nonetheless, the court felt that
even the risk of an employee having to pay the arbitrator's compensation would be sufficient
to deter employees from bringing statutory claims to arbitration and result in a de facto
forfeiture of statutory rights. Id. See also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687 (Cal. 2000) (concluding that, "when an employer imposes mandatory
arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or arbitration process
cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would
not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court."); Paladino v.
Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the
possibility that high costs will be paid by the employee is a legitimate basis for refusing to
enforce an arbitration agreement.). But see Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (finding that an "arbitration agreement's silence on [cost allocation],
and that fact alone is plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable.").
164. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Wheat First Securities, Inc., 257
F.3d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2001), distinguished its decision in Cole and refused to extend its
holding in Cole to cases involving non-statutory state law claims. The Brown case involved
claims of wrongful termination, breach of implied contract, defamation, slander, and tortious
interference. Id.
165. See Bradford v Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001)
(upholding a fee-splitting provision requiring the employee to pay half of arbitrator's fees and
costs); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the amici argument that fee-splitting renders arbitration agreement unenforceable).
166. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
167. Id. at 90.
168. In that case, the Court considered "the question whether an arbitration agreement
that does not mention arbitration costs and fees is unenforceable because it fails to
affirmatively protect a party from potentially steep arbitration costs," and concluded that "an
arbitration agreement's silence with respect to such matters does not render the agreement
unenforceable." Id. at 82. Refusing to enforce such an agreement "would undermine the
'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."' Id. at 89-91 (quoting Moses H.
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prohibitive expense on the party resisting the enforcement of the

arbitration agreement.'69 The Green Tree decision effectively overrules
the per se rule in Cole and mandates a case-by-case analysis.'70
The Court declined to offer guidance on the level of detail litigants
must produce to carry their burden as to prohibitive expense except that
a speculative "risk" of prohibitively high expenses is insufficient.' The
Court similarly offered no guidance as to when this evidentiary showing
must be made because in Green Tree "neither during discovery nor

when the case was presented on the merits was there any timely showing
at all on the point."'72 Various courts of appeals have reached different

conclusions; some require this issue to be resolved as a threshold matter,
others require this issue to be resolved during judicial review of the
arbitrator's decision.'
Under Green Tree, the financial affluence of a prospective litigant is
relevant and is listed by courts as one factor to be considered in a case-

by-case analysis of whether arbitration denies the claimant an adequate
forum for the resolution of statutory claims.' Nothing in the statutory
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
169. The Court held that where "a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on
the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of
showing the likelihood of incurring such costs." Id. at 92. The Court analogized this burden
to "the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration" and the
"burden of establishing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the statutory claims
at issue." Id. at 91-92. Both of these burdens are on the party resisting enforcement of the
arbitration agreement. Id.
170. Nevertheless, Cole is cited as persuasive dicta on the issue of cost deterrence and
defeating the remedial and deterrent function of the statutes. See, e.g., Bradford, 238 F.3d
549 (4th Cir. 2001).
171. The Court stated, "The 'risk' that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is
too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement." Green Tree, 531 U.S.
at 91.
172. Id. at 92.
173. Compare Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687 (Cal.
2000) (holding that "cost issues should be resolved not at the judicial review stage but when a
court is petitioned to compel arbitration.") with Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that "if unreasonable fees were to be imposed
on a particular employee," the argument that the imposition of such fees is inconsistent with
the statute at issue "could be presented by the employee to the reviewing court").
174. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90-91. See also Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556 (4th Cir.
2001) (upholding a fee-splitting provision requiring employees to pay half of arbitrator's fees
and costs and that a case-by-case inquiry includes, "among other things, upon the claimant's
ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration
and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the
bringing of claims"); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir.
1999) (finding unenforceable a mandatory arbitration agreement containing a fee-splitting
arrangement requiring employee to pay one-half of the arbitrator's fees because "Mr.

2002]

CIRCUIT CITY V. ADAMS

scheme of Title VII, as amended, contemplates that the affluence of a
prospective litigant is in any way relevant. Indeed, in the Act's
provision authorizing the awarding of attorney's fees, the wealthy
destitute litigant. 171
litigant is equally entitled to attorney's fees as the
Paying substantial arbitration costs is no more palatable to the rich than
to the poor. Why should any party be compelled to pay costs in an
arbitral forum that they would not bear in a judicial forum simply
because a court believes them capable of doing so? The logical result is
that arbitrators will decide the statutory rights of affluent claimants and
judges and juries will decide the statutory rights of poor claimants. As
the pervasive spirit of the civil rights statutes is equality of treatment,
this outcome is utterly inconsistent with that spirit.
C. Violations of ContractPrinciples
The FAA's coverage provision, section 2, endorses the enforcement
of arbitration agreements "in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce.., save upon grounds 1as76
of any contract."
exist at law or in equity for the revocation
Therefore, "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening § 2."1 These common law contract
doctrines are discussed below.
1. Unconscionable Contract of Adhesion
On September 12, 2001, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after
reviewing de novo the district court's decision to refuse to compel

Shankle could not afford such a fee, and it is unlikely other similarly situated employees could
either."); Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1999) (enforcing
an arbitration agreement requiring employee to pay one-half of the forum fees after noting
that "[t]he evidence in this case does not indicate that Williams is unable to pay one-half of
the forum fees or that they are prohibitively expensive for him.... Williams testified that he
was making more money than he did at Cigna and his 'income so far this year is in excess of
six figures."'); Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 15-16.
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994) (attorney's fees provision).
176. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
177. Doctors Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). In Doctor's Associates,
the Supreme Court distinguished generally applicable contract defenses that apply to "any
contract" from state provisions that "specifically and solely" apply to arbitration provisions.
Id. at 683. The Court held any latter provision "conflicts with the FAA and is therefore
displaced by the federal measure." Id.
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arbitration, decided Ticknor v. Choice Hotels International,Inc.7 ' The
federal district court, after applying Montana contract law, had refused
enforcement of an arbitration clause contained in a franchise agreement
between Ticknor and Choice Hotels.'79 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
two conclusions of the district court. 8 First, the franchise agreement
constituted a contract of adhesion because it "was a standardized, form
agreement that Ticknor was forced to accept or reject without
negotiation."''
Second, the arbitration provision was unconscionable
because it required binding arbitration of claims by Ticknor, the weaker
bargaining party, but allowed Choice Hotels, the drafter and the
stronger bargaining party, to bring claims in state or federal court.'82 As
such, the Ninth Circuit concluded, "[T]he arbitration provision... 'lacks
mutuality of obligation, is one-sided, 83and contains terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the drafter.'" 1
On September 26, 2001, the Ninth Circuit, on remand and applying
California law, decided Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. 4 The court,
citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services Inc.'

extensively, found Circuit City's Dispute Resolution Agreement
substantively and procedurally unconscionable.'86
The California
178. 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001).
179. Ticknor Lodging Corporation executed an Econo Lodge Franchise Agreement with
Choice Hotels International, Inc. The franchise agreement, which was a preprinted standard
form instrument drafted by Choice, contained an arbitration clause providing as follows:
Except for our claims against you for indemnification, actions for collection of
moneys owed us under this Agreement, or actions seeking to enjoin you from using
the Marks in violation of this Agreement, any controversy or claim relating to this
Agreement, or the breach of this Agreement, including any claim that this
Agreement or any part of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, or otherwise voidable or
void, will be sent to final and binding arbitration in accordance with the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
Id. at 935.
180. Id. at 939-41. Relying upon the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Iwen v. U.S.
West Direct, 293 Mont. 512, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999), the court concluded that "[t]o
determine the enforceability of a specific contractual provision under Iwen, a Montana court
must first decide whether the contract is one of adhesion." Ticknor, 265 F.3d at 939. "If so,
then the provision will'not be enforced against the weaker contracting party if it is (1) not
within that party's reasonable expectations, or (2) if within those expectations, it is unduly
oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy." Id. (citing Iwen, 977 P.2d at 994-95).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 940-41.
183. Id. (quoting Iwen, 977 P.2d at 996)
184. 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002).
185. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
186. Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 893.
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Supreme Court in Armendariz 7 reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals compelling arbitration and remanded the case "with directions
to affirm the judgment of the trial court" that had invalidated the entire
The California Supreme Court endorsed the
arbitration agreement.'
89
analysis of the "judicially created doctrine of unconscionability'
9
announced in Graham v. Scissor-TailInc.1'
An analysis of "[u]nconscionability . . . begins with an inquiry into
9
whether the contract is one of adhesion."' ' "If the contract is adhesive,
the court must then determine whether 'other factors are present which,
under established legal rules-legislative or judicial-operate to render
The court identified two judicially imposed
it [unenforceable].' ' "'
187. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). In this case, employees had filled out and signed application
forms that contained an arbitration clause. The clause stated as follows:
I agree as a condition of my employment, that in the event my employment is
terminated, and I contend that such termination. was wrongful or otherwise in
violation of the conditions of employment or was in violation of any express or
implied condition, term or covenant of employment, whether founded in fact or law,
including but not limited to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or otherwise
in violation of any of my rights, I and Employer agree to submit any such matter to
binding arbitration. .... I and Employer further expressly agree that in any such
arbitration, my exclusive remedies ... shall be limited to a sum equal to the wages I
would have earned from the date of any discharge until the date of the arbitration
award. I understand that I shall not be entitled to any other remedy, at law or in
equity, including but not limited to reinstatement and/or injunctive relief.
Id. at 675.
188. Id. at 699.
189. Id. at 689.
190. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
"The term [contract of adhesion] signifies a
191. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689.
standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or
reject it." Id. (quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690 (Dist. Ct. App.
1961)).
192. Id. (quoting Graham,623 P.2d 165 (alteration in original)). The court endorsed the
definition of unconscionability explained in A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App.
3d 473, 486-87 (1982) ("[U]nconscionability has both a 'procedural' and a 'substantive'
due to unequal bargaining power,
element, the former focusing on 'oppression' or 'surprise'
'
the latter on 'overly harsh' or 'one-sided results. ") (citations omitted). The court stated:
"The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be
present... for a court.., to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of
unconscionability." Armendariz, 6 P.2d at 690 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal.
App. 4th 1519, 1533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). The court continued: "But... they need not be
Id.(citation omitted).
present in the same degree. 'Essentially a sliding scale is invoked....'
"[Tihe more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and
vice versa." Id.
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limitations on the enforcement of adhesion contracts:
[F]irst... such a contract or provision which does not fall within
the reasonable expectations of the weaker or "adhering" party
will not be enforced against him... [and] second .... a contract
or provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expectations
of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in its
context, it is unduly oppressive or "unconscionable."193
Applying these principles, the court concluded that the arbitration
agreement was adhesive.'
The court then concluded that the
agreement was substantively unconscionable because it required only
employees to arbitrate their wrongful termination claims against the
employer, but did not require the employer to arbitrate any claims it
may have against the employees.' The court also concluded that "[t]he

unconscionable

one-sidedness

of the

arbitration

agreement

is

compounded in this case by the fact that it does not permit the full

recovery of damages for employees, while placing no such restriction on
the employer.' 96 The court found the agreement procedurally
unconscionable because it was imposed as a condition of employment
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
In Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 97 a California
appellate court upheld the discharge of an employee who refused to sign
a compulsory prospective arbitration agreement.

The court cited

several post-Gilmer decisions rejecting arguments that prospective
193. Armendariz, 6 P.2d at 689 (citations omitted).
194. The Armendariz court reasoned:
It was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no
opportunity to negotiate.
Moreover, in the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic
pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be
particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and
necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because
of an arbitration requirement.
Id. at 690.
195. "[A]n arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive context lacks basic fairness
and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate all
claims... "Id. at 694. The court acknowledged and rejected the contrary result reached by
the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex Parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 598-99 (Ala.1998).
Armendariz, 6 P.2d at 692-93.
196. Id. at 694.
197. 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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arbitration agreements imposed as a condition of employment constitute
invalid contracts of adhesion.'8 The court concluded that the cases have
uniformly agreed that compulsory prospective arbitration agreements
are not invalid just because they may be required as a99condition of
employment or are offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.'
What is clear from this case law is that prospective arbitration
agreements, without some sort of substantive unconscionability, are not
invalid simply because they are compulsory. Conversely, a substantively
unconscionable arbitration agreement, without some sort of procedural
unconscionability, is not invalid simply because its terms appear onesided. An unconscionable and therefore unenforceable arbitration
agreement must be actually or effectively compulsory due to
disproportionate bargaining power, and the terms of the agreement
must be unduly harsh, oppressive, and/or one-sided.
2. Consideration
Two interesting questions of consideration arise when an arbitration
provision is part of an employee handbook unilaterally promulgated by
an employer. First, is new or continuing employment adequate
consideration when an employer first introduces an employee handbook
either to applicants or incumbent workers? Second, is continued
employment adequate consideration when an employer unilaterally
modifies an existing employee handbook by inserting an arbitration
provision?
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth
Hospital Center,2"' addressed the first question. The court noted that
while "[s]everal courts have rejected the notion that an employee
handbook or manual can ever create binding contractual obligations....
[T]he overwhelming majority of courts ... have held that an employee
handbook may, under proper circumstances, be contractually
binding."°0' The court then established three conditions necessary for an
employee's continued work to constitute consideration for the promises
198. The Lagatree court cited, among others, Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc.,
167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 170
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998); Kelly v.
UHC Management Co., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Beauchamp v. Great West
Life Assur. Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D.Mich. 1996); Lang v. Burlington Northern Railroad
Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993).
199. Lagatree,88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680.
200. 505 N.E.2d 314, 316-17 (Ill. 1987).
201. Id. (citations omitted).
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in the employee handbook2 2 and held the employee handbook to be a
binding contract.0 3
In the context of an initial employment offer, if an arbitration

provision in an employee handbook is sufficiently clear and definite, the
provision is clearly disclosed to the applicant, the applicant signs an
acknowledgment form agreeing to arbitrate employment claims, and the

applicant commences work, the employer's providing at-will
employment will constitute sufficient consideration in exchange for the
employee's agreement to arbitrate his or her employment disputes. 2°' If
an employer is promulgating an employee handbook containing an
arbitration provision for the first time, the aforementioned conditions
must be present to bind incumbent workers to its terms by their
continued work.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital,25
2 "6
limited the impact of its earlier ruling in Duldulao.
In Doyle the court

considered whether continuing work by the employee, without more,
would be adequate consideration for an employer's unilateral
modification of an employee handbook, and distinguished an
202. The court determined that "an employee handbook or other policy statement" can
create "enforceable contractual rights" if the following three conditions are met:
First, the language.., must contain a promise clear enough that an employee would
reasonably believe that an offer has been made. Second, the statement must be
disseminated to the employee in such a manner that the employee is aware of its
contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer. Third, the employee must accept
the offer by commencing or continuing to work after learning of the policy
statement. When these conditions are present, then the employee's continued work
constitutes consideration for the promises contained in the statement, and.., a valid
contract is formed.
Id. at 318.
203. Id. at 319.
204. See, e.g., Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 595 (Ala. 1998). "United's
provision of new at-will employment ... was sufficient consideration to make McNaughton's
promise to arbitrate employment disputes under United's arbitration policy a binding
agreement." Id. at 596.
205. 708 N.E.2d 1140 (II. 1999).
206. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned:
We believe that Duldulao's reference to continued work was intended to apply to
cases in which an employer who did not previously have an employee handbook
decides to promulgate one; in those circumstances, employees' continued work for
the employer represents consideration for the handbook. Duldulao did not involve
handbook modifications, and therefore the court in that case was not speaking to the
situation involved here.
Doyle, 708 N.E.2d at 1146.
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employer's

unilateral

modification

to the

detriment

of current

employees from an employer's unilateral modification to the benefit of
The court concluded that "after an employer is
current employees.
contractually bound to the provisions of an employee handbook,

unilateral modification of its terms by the employer to an employee's
disadvantage fails for lack of consideration." ' In dicta, the court stated
that continued employment would be consideration for an employer's
2
unilateral modification to the benefit of current employees. 0 Modifying
an existing employee handbook by inserting a mandatory arbitration
provision requiring incumbent employees to waive their statutory
judicial forum constitutes a unilateral modification to their detriment
and, according to Doyle, will require consideration other than continued
employment.10
3. Mutuality

While Graham declares unconscionable selection provisions
designating as arbitrator a party or one closely allied with a party,
Graham does not "limit the power of contracting parties to designate

arbitrators who, with the knowledge of the parties, may have an interest
in the dispute or who sustain some relationship to a party which would
212
Nevertheless,
otherwise disqualify the arbitrator from serving.
207. See generallyid. at 1144-47.
208. Id. at 1145. The court noted that:
[B]ecause the defendant was seeking to reduce the rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs
under the employee handbook, it was the defendant, and not the plaintiffs, who
would properly be required to provide consideration for the modification. But in
adding the disclaimer to the handbook, the defendant provided nothing of value to
the plaintiffs and did not itself incur any disadvantage. In fact, the opposite
occurred: the plaintiffs suffered a detriment - the loss of rights previously granted to
them by the handbook - while the defendant gained a corresponding benefit.
Id.
209. Id. at 1146. The court dismissed defendant's argument "that if continued
employment does not constitute consideration for a disclaimer, then it also cannot constitute
consideration for benefits that would be conferred on existing employees by later versions of
the handbook." Id. The court concludes, "[T]he employee's decision to accept the beneficial
modification by his or her continued performance would be supported by consideration." Id.
210. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 49 S.W.3d 507 (Tex.App. 2001) (concluding
that an employer's mandatory arbitration policy was unenforceable against an at-will
employee who was already working when the policy was promulgated and that any implied
benefit of continued employment was illusory for an at-will employee).
211. See supra Part III.A.
212. Graham, 623 P.2d at 175 (quoting In re Cross & Brown Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d 573, 576
(1957)).
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employers must be careful how they structure such arrangements.
In Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc.,"' the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals refused to enforce an arbitration agreement after
finding that there was no mutuality of obligation.1 The court found
that the arbitral forum retained unfettered discretion "to alter the
applicable rules and procedures without any obligation to notify, much
less receive consent from" the employees." 5 As such, the court ruled
that there was an illusory promise that did not create a binding

contract.216 In Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc.,217 the Seventh
Circuit reached the same conclusion.1
The arbitration agreement
between EDS and Penn contained only "an unascertainable, illusory
promise on the part of EDS."219
A lack of mutuality argument can be presented when the mandatory
arbitration language is included in an employment handbook.
Employers often retain the power to modify the handbook's provision at
any time, without the consent of employees. In Snow v. BE & K
Construction Co., 220 a federal district court in Maine refused to enforce

an arbitration agreement contained in a six-page booklet. The booklet
specifically stated, "The Company reserves the right to modify or
discontinue this program at any time." 22 1 In such a case, it can certainly
be argued that there is a lack of mutuality and, as such, no enforceable
contract for mandatory arbitration. The court felt the defendant was
, 22
trying to "have its cake and eat it too.

213. 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
214. Id. at 315 (applying Kentucky and Tennessee contract law).
215. Id. at 315-16.
216. Id. at 316. "Where a promisor retains an unlimited right to decide later the nature
or extent of his performance, the promise is too indefinite for legal enforcement. The
unlimited choice in effect destroys the promise and makes it merely illusory." Id. (citing 1
SAMUEL WILLISTON,CONTRACTS § 43, at 140 (3d ed. 1957)).
217. 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001).
218. Id. at 759 (applying Indiana law of contract).
219. Id.
220. 126 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. Me. 2001).
221. Id. at 9 (citing BE & K Employee Solution Program at 4).
222. Id. at 15. The court stated:
Defendant wished to bind its employees to the terms of the booklet, while carving
out an escape route that would enable the company to avoid the terms of the
booklet if it later realized that the booklet's terms no longer served its interests.
Here, Defendant unilaterally constructed all of the rules of its alternative dispute
resolution program, without negotiating with Plaintiff or asking her to demonstrate
her assent with a signature. Therefore, it would be fundamentally unfair to hold
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4. Severability
The court, in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services,
Inc., addressed the circumstances under which it would sever or restrict
an unconscionable provision, as opposed to refusing to enforce the
agreement in its entirety.

3

The court, after a lengthy analysis of

California statutory and case law regarding the severability of illegal
contract terms, concluded that the principles announced:
appear fully applicable to the doctrine of unconscionability ....
If the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality,
then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced. If the illegality

is collateral to the main purpose... and.., can be extirpated...
by means of severance or restriction, then such severance and
restriction are appropriate. 4
The court offered two reasons for refusing to enforce the arbitration
First, there was more than one
agreement in its entirety.
unconscionable provision in the arbitration agreement at issue. 5 "[I]t
unconscionably
an
has both an unlawful damages provision.n
2"' 7
mutuality so
of
lack
the
Second,
clause.
arbitration
unilateral
a court can
provision
single
no
is
permeates the agreement that "there

Plaintiff to the terms of the booklet, when Defendant retains its ability to evade the
booklet's terms entirely.
Id.
223. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 695-99 (Cal.
2000). While California case law interpreting California statutory law is in no way binding on
federal courts interpreting the FAA, it is instructive by analogy when federal courts apply
state contract law in diversity cases.
224. Id. at 696.
225. See also Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Philips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing
to enforce an arbitration agreement in its entirety because Hooters promulgated "so many
biased rules" that it created a "sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration").
226. The court described the arbitration agreement as follows:
The arbitration agreement specifies that damages are to be limited to the amount of
backpay lost up until the time of arbitration. This provision excludes damages for
prospective future earnings, so called "front pay," a common and often substantial
component of contractual damages in a wrongful termination case.
Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 694 (citations omitted). The employer, on the other hand, is bound by
no comparable limitation should it pursue a claim against its employees. Id.
227. Id. at 697. "Such multiple defects indicate a systematic effort to impose arbitration
on an employee not simply as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works
to the employer's advantage." Id.
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strike or restrict in order to remove the unconscionable taint. ... ,"

The court would be required to reform the contract by adding language,
as opposed to simply severing or restricting an offending term and
229
declined to do so.
There is a split among federal circuit courts of appeals regarding
severability.23 ° In Gannon v. Circuit City Stores Inc., the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in-Perez
v. Globe Airport Security Services Inc.,232 regarding the enforceability of
a mandatory arbitration employment contract that attempted to limit
damages to less than the statutory remedy. The Eleventh Circuit, in
Perez, considered whether an entire arbitration agreement was
unenforceable when it allocated the costs of arbitration equally between
the employee and the employer.233 Since fees are available to a
prevailing party in Title VII claims, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
mandating equal sharing of fees and costs of arbitration circumscribed
the arbitrator's authority to grant effective relief.2 4 Further, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that if an employer could rely on courts to
simply sever an unlawful or unconscionable provision and enforce the
remainder, the employer would have an incentive to include unlawful
provisions in its arbitration agreements. 23 ' The Eleventh Circuit held the
228. Id.
229. Id. The court did not feel authorized by statute or case law to reform and augment
contracts. Id.
230. Compare Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001) with
Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280,1287 (11th Cir. 2001).
231. 262 F.3d 677.
232. 253 F.3d 1280.
233. Id. at 1283.
234. Id. at 1285. Title VII provides that a prevailing party may be awarded reasonable
attorney's fees, including expert fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(1994).
By denying access to a remedy Congress made available to ensure violations of the
statute are effectively remedied and deterred, the Agreement eroded the ability of
arbitration to serve those purposes as effectively as litigation. See Robert A.
Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes,
1995 U.ILL. L.REv. 635, 665 (1995) (Curtailing the availability of a statutorily
available remedy reduces the potential award, "undercut[s] the strong compensatory
policy of the statute ...[and] threaten[s] the initiation of many meritorious
arbitration proceedings."). Globe's attempt to defeat the remedial purpose of Title
VII taints the entire agreement, making it unenforceable.
Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287.
235. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287. But see Gannon, 262 F.3d at 681 (noting that Gannon
advanced this argument). The Eighth Circuit later rejected Gannon's argument stating, "If
we were to hold entire arbitration agreements unenforceable every time a particular term is
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entire arbitration agreement unenforceable.236

The Eighth Circuit, in Gannon, considered the severability of a
provision limiting punitive damages.237 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, as amicus curiae, argued that the Eighth
Circuit should follow the Eleventh Circuit's precedent and hold the
entire arbitration agreement unenforceable.238 The Eighth Circuit,
relying on Missouri contract law, instead opted to merely sever the
limitation on punitive damages and enforce the remainder of the
mandatory arbitration agreement."9 The Eighth Circuit specifically
noted Perez and rejected the Eleventh Circuit's public policy analysis

regarding severability. 24"
In Circuit City, the Ninth Circuit, on remand, refused to enforce
Circuit City's dispute resolution agreement in its entirety due to its

unconscionability. 24' The court rejected the opportunity to sever the
Citing
unconscionable provisions and enforce the remainder. 2
provisions
objectionable
"the
that
concluded
court
Armendariz, the
pervade the entire contract."2 43 Noting the multiple unconscionable

provisions and the unilateral character of the agreement, the court
to rewriting the contract, which is
declined to "go beyond mere excision
, 2"
Court.
this
of
role
proper
the
not
5. Knowing and Voluntary
Explicit in the Supreme Court's dictum in Alexander is that an
employee's waiver of a "cause of action under Title VII ', 245 must be
"voluntary and knowing." 2" Implicit in the Supreme Court's analysis in
held invalid, it would discourage parties from forming contracts under the FAA and severely
chill parties... for fear that minor terms could be used to undermine the validity of the entire
contract." Id. at 681.
236. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287.
237. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 679.
238. Id. at 681 n.4.
239. Id. at 683. The clause found invalid limited punitive damages to five thousand
dollars. Id. at 679 n.2.
240. "We recognize that the Eleventh Circuit has found public-policy arguments similar
to those advanced by Gannon persuasive ....To the extent that the court relied on these
public-policy arguments for its holding, we would disagree with the decision in Perez."
Gannon, 262 F.3d at 683 n.8.
241. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2001).
242. Id. at 896.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974).
246. Id. at 52 n.15.
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Gilmer is the knowing and voluntary nature of Gilmer's agreement to
arbitrate."7 In the context of unequal bargaining power, the Court is
careful to note that Gilmer was "an experienced businessman" and thus
unlikely to have been "coerced or defrauded" into agreeing to
arbitrate.'4' A number of commentators have encouraged the adoption
of a "knowing and voluntary" standard for any waiver of rights under
the civil rights statutes.249
The Ninth Circuit, in PrudentialInsurance Co. of America v. Lai,2s°

concluded that "a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to... arbitrate
her claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to
'
arbitration."251
The court refused to enforce arbitration of sexual
harassment and discrimination claims pursuant to a U-4 form that did
not describe the types of disputes that were to be subject to

arbitration.25 2 In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc.,253 the

Fourth Circuit, in dicta, noted that arbitration of statutory claims "is
permissible when voluntary. ,24
In Seus v. John Nuveen & Co.,255 the Ninth Circuit specifically
247. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36 (1991).
248. Id. at 33.
249. See, e.g., Lewis Maltby, ParadiseLost - How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity
for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 10
(1994) (arguing that arbitration agreements should be "knowing and voluntary); Karen
Halverson, Arbitration and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 445, 447-48,
479-84 (1999) (proposing a voluntariness standard "similar to the requirement for a 'knowing
and voluntary' waiver specified in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act" for claims
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.).
250. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
251. Id. at 1305.
We agree with appellants that Congress intended there to be at least a knowing
agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be deemed to
have waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies and procedural
protections prescribed in Title VII and related state statutes. Such congressional
intent, which has been noted in other judicial decisions, is apparent from the text
and legislative history of Title VII.
Id. at 1304.
252. Id. at 1305. The court stated: "Moreover, even if appellants had signed a contract
containing the NASD arbitration clause, it would not put them on notice that they were
bound to arbitrate Title VII claims. That provision did not even refer to employment
disputes." Id.
253. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
254. Id. at 881. The court reached this conclusion by noting that Congressional
conference reports support this view and "[in this circuit, conference reports are the most
persuasive evidence of legislative intent, after the statute itself." Id.
255. 146 F.3d 175,183 (3d Cir. 1998).
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rejected a "heightened knowing and voluntary standard" for prospective
arbitration agreements.2 6 The Fifth Circuit distinguishes "the waiver or
release of substantive" statutory rights from the waiver or release of
"procedural rights like the right to proceed in a judicial forum." 57
Waiving substantive statutory claims might necessitate an inquiry into
such matters as the "specificity of the language of the agreement, the
plaintiff's education and experience, plaintiff's opportunity for
deliberation and negotiation, and whether plaintiff was encouraged to

consult counsel."- 8 Waiving procedural statutory rights only requires an
employee to understand a binding agreement was being made and there
was no evidence of fraud or duress."

The Seventh Circuit, in Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses Inc.,2W6
evaded "decid[ing] whether this circuit should adopt the Ninth Circuit's
'knowing and voluntary waiver' standard for evaluating the
enforceability of arbitration agreements in the employment
context .... 261 While the majority opinion questioned "the continued
validity" of the Ninth Circuit's .'knowing and voluntary waiver' standard
for evaluating the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the
employment context "in light of the Circuit City Stores decision,"2' 62 the
concurring opinion implied that such a standard continues to exist. 3
256. Seus, 146 F.3d at 183. The Fifth Circuit, in enforcing a U-4 agreement to compel
arbitration of multiple claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 stated, "We respectfully
disagree with the decision of the court in Lai." Id. at 183 n.2.
257. Id. at 184 n.2.
258. Id. at 183.
259. Id. at 184. The court noted that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum." Id. at 180 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20,
26 (1991)).
260. 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001).
261. Id. at 761.
262. Id.
263. Id. The concurrence noted that:
Penn was being hired as a waiter in a chain restaurant, not as a corporate executive.
His employment was only to be "at will." Likely a substantial share of his income
would be from tips.... Above his signature this agreement states that Penn signed it
"knowingly and voluntarily." We doubt it could have been 'knowingly' in view of its
complexities, or even "voluntarily." Had he questioned its meaning and its
complexities, it is doubtful Penn would have been hired. However, the agreement
provided that Penn had the right to consult an attorney, but even if Penn could have
afforded an attorney, the appearance of any attorney on the scene would doubtless
have foreclosed any job opportunity. In Ryan's eyes, Penn would look like a
troublemaker. If he wanted the waiter's job, he would be trapped in an unfair
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The necessary scope, clarity, and specificity of any arbitration
language remain unclear.6 The agreement in Circuit City specifically
listed several federal employment discrimination statutes by name.26 '
Subsequent agreements should be careful to include specific references
to the waiver or modification of procedural rights (e.g., judicial forum
generally; jury trial specifically), and substantive rights (e.g., class-wide
remedies, punitive damages). The arbitration agreement should be
crafted in language the ordinary person can understand, be individually
presented and explained to each employee or applicant, and require the

employee's signature.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hard cases make bad law.266 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams is a
hard case and it makes bad law. Had the court adopted the view of the
Ninth Circuit, employment contracts would be exempt from arbitration.
The enforceability of arbitration agreements would remain primarily a

matter of state contract law. Since compulsory, prospective arbitration
agreements would be impermissible under the FAA, arguments
regarding the incompatibility of arbitration with statutory text, history
and purposes would be rendered moot. Instead, the Court sided with a
majority of jurisdictions in limiting the FAA exemption of employment
contracts to those of transportation workers only. In so doing, the Court
situation until a court could unravel it.
Id. (Harlington, J., concurring).
264. See Romo v. Y-3 Holdings, Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 208 (Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The
California Court of Appeals ruled that an employee who signed a handbook
acknowledgement but did not sign the arbitration section of the handbook was not bound to
arbitrate her discharge claim.
265. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001).
By way of example only, such claims include claims under federal, state, and local
statutory or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract
and [the] law of tort.
Id.
266. Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his first dissent as a member of the U.S. Supreme Court,
observed that "[g]reat cases, like hard cases, make bad law ....
[I]mmediate interests
exercise a hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will bend." N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 400-01 (1903). In a Title VII context, Chief Justice Burger, expressed the same
sentiment. "[Hiard cases always tempt judge[s] to exceed the limits of their authority, as the
Court does today by totally rewriting a crucial part of Title VII to reach a 'desirable' result."
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 218 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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ensures that federal courts will be hip-deep in questions of statutory
interpretation and the application of state common law contract rules as
a predicate matter to the actual arbitration of any statutory civil rights
claim. The Court, by indulging a slavish devotion to the "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration," invites many new interpretive questions
without offering any insight on how to answer them. The Court has
opened Pandora's Box and the interpretive evils released will descend,
case-by-case, upon the federal courts.

